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Kargil: The politics of war

The Kargil development have exposed much of the official saffron [Hindu fundamentalist] propaganda concerning Kashmir and Indo-Pakistan relations as a veritable bundle of lies.

The ruling party's claim of the grand success of Prime Minister Vajpayee's bus diplomacy [opening a direct bus route to Pakistan] and the Lahore Declaration [a vague promise to control the arms race] sounds a mischievous mockery.

What was paraded as the Vajpayee government’s great achievement is now turning out to be a big diplomatic fiasco...

For the Vajpayee government, Operation Vijay [the Indian military response] is first of all a political move. The aim is to whip up war hysteria and sweep away all pressing issues before the people under the carpet of jingoism. In the name of tackling a war-like situation, the saffron establishment is seeking political sanction for its own fascist agenda. Politicisation of the armed forces has reached threatening proportions. Army bosses are not only daily briefing the media, they are also reported to be attending meetings of the ruling BJP party.

Most political contenders of BJP are also contributing to the intensification of war-hysteria by trying to beat the government in the field of jingoism. There is a clamour for banning the Pakistan TV in India and even an embargo on the beaming of world cup cricket matches so that the nation's attention is not diverted from Kargil!

The Left must hold high the banner of peace and appeal to democratic forces in both India and Pakistan to prevail over their respective governments and prevent the outbreak of a fourth Indo-Pakistan war. Heightened tension and continuing air strikes may also create a Yugoslavia-type situation in India leading to more direct imperialist intervention in the region. All genuine patriots must therefore fight for a return to peaceful bilateral diplomacy between India and Pakistan to stop infiltration in Kargil and work out a phased negotiated settlement of the Kashmir question.

 

Duncan Chapple adds:

Bill Clinton met with Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif early in July to discuss the Kashmir conflict.

The meeting concluded with Sharif calling for the withdrawal of Muslim fundamentalist guerrillas from positions in the Indian controlled section of the disputed Kashmir region. Sharif’s agreement appeared to be just the capitulation he came to Washington in hopes of avoiding.

However, examining the issues in Pakistan as well as events in Afghanistan suggests that there may be more to the deal than appears on the surface.

Sharif approved the dispatch of Pakistani backed guerrillas to the Indian side of Kashmir’s Line of Control, in part, as a means of winning domestic support from Pakistan’s military and Muslim fundamentalists and, in part, in hopes of pushing the international community to intervene in the dispute. While the infiltrators scored some initial successes, the Indian military has been making slow but steady progress in driving out the guerrillas.

Meanwhile, the international community, worried about a possible escalation of the conflict between these two newest nuclear powers, almost universally blamed Pakistan for the incursion and refused to become involved in the dispute. Sharif’s options are to escalate the conflict – further worsening Pakistan’s international isolation and risking a much more substantial loss, or withdrawing the forces – risking a domestic outcry and possibly his career.

Neither option is attractive, and having been soundly rebuffed when he went to Beijing for support, Sharif turned to the US in a last ditch effort to salvage some semblance of victory from his losing venture. Yet he came away from the US talks with apparently very little. He has to withdraw the forces from Kashmir. What could Sharif have sought in return: only US support in internationalising the diplomatic dispute over Kashmir.

He wants internationally mediated negotiations between India and Pakistan on Kashmir. This he can declare domestically as a victory, arguing that the incursion and his diplomatic initiative put Kashmir on the international agenda.

That is fine for Sharif, but besides the temporary decrease in tensions in South Asia, what does the US get in return? After all, it is far from clear that either side planned or plans to escalate the conflict to full scale war, or that a full scale war would degenerate into a nuclear exchange.

Washington has a major interest in the region, in regards to which Pakistan might be able to offer assistance. The US wants Saudi terrorist Osama bin Laden’s head on a platter – or at very least on his shoulders in a US prison.

Bin Laden is reportedly in Afghanistan, under the protection and care of the Taleban militia.

As Sharif headed back to Pakistan, prepared to call for the withdrawal of infiltrators from Indian-controlled Kashmir, the U.S. announced on July 6th that it was placing new sanctions on the Taleban. The sanctions are meaningless if the Pakistanis do not abide by them – and that may just be the point. Sharif may have agreed to pressure the Taleban on the bin Laden issue in return for the US pressuring both India and the UN on Kashmir.

Whether the U.S. sweetened the deal with the possibility of recognising the Taleban is unclear, though it has been suggested as a possibility in the past. US companies are eager to run a pipeline from Central Asia through western Afghanistan, and with competition for Central Asia heating up between the US, Russia, and Iran, this option may be worth recognising the Taleban.

Indo-Pakistan conflict in Kashmir

 

Editorial from Liberation, publication of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)

 

 

The Indian military response is first of all a political move. The aim is to whip up war hysteria and sweep away all pressing issues before the people under the carpet of jingoism. In the name of tackling a war-like situation, the establishment is seeking political sanction for its own fascist agenda