Soon after emerging as independent nations, Chile and Bolivia maintained differences on the limits that divided them in the coastal fringe. The Chilean interpretation established that its territory reached until parallel 23 of South latitude, while Bolivia sustained it was parallel 26. The situation became more complicated when important deposits of salitre -nitrate used as fertilizer and for the production of gunpowder- were discovered in the territory under dispute. In 1866 the governments of La Paz and Santiago settled their territorial differences by subscribing a treaty that established parallel 24 as their limit, and agreed the division on equal parts of the earnings from the nitrate exploded among parallels 23 and 25. However the Treaty would not be satisfactory for the new Bolivian authorities because was it signed by Mariano Melgarejo, a Dictator obviously influenced by Chilean interests. In consequence, in 1872, a revision was carried out, and in 1874 a new treaty was signed, by means of which Chile gave up the economic benefits of the exploitation of the mineral’s deposits in the area between parallel 24 and 25. In exchange, Bolivia committed itself in not increasing taxes over nitrate exports during the next 25 years, until 1899.

Bolivian jurisdiction over Atacama remained however, a nominal element. The Chilean presence was overwhelming; its population overcame the Bolivian thoroughly and its companies dominated the economy of the territory. The Bolivian political authority was fictitious because of the enormous distances that divided that region from the Government's headquarters in La Paz.

In February 1878, the Bolivian Congress, trusted in the exercise of its sovereignty over Atacama, imposed over the Chilean Company “Salitres and Railroad of Antofagasta” a tax of ten cents of Pesos over each quintal of nitrate that it exported. Salitres and Railroad rejected such an imposition, considering it a violation to the 1874 treaty, and instead of appealing to a civil tribunal, it claimed through its government. This way the Chilean Chancellery requested the Bolivian authorities to repeal the tribute or to appeal to arbitration. Bolivia refused under the argument that it was an internal matter. Chile did not accept such explanation and insisted on its demands. Since Bolivia did not rectified its decision, in January 1879 the Chilean Government, after seeking unsuccessfully for an arbitration to solve the dispute, dispatched to the port of Antofagasta, by way of deterrence, the battleship Blanco Encalada. On February 1st, Bolivia, in protest for the presence of the warship in its territorial waters, announced that the Chilean companies would be confiscated and auction in two weeks.

The Chilean reaction was harsh. On February 12th, the Minister of External Affairs sent to his General Consul in Antofagasta the following communication:

“In few hours more, the land that belonged to us before 1866 will be occupied by maritime and land forces of the Republic and your Excellency will assume the position of political and civil Governor of that territory”

In the date foreseen for the auction, following direct orders from the President of Chile, a force of 700 soldiers disembarked in Antofagasta. The troops didn't find organized resistance and soon extended their control to the adjacent coastal towns and claimed the territories for Chile. On March 1st, 1879, the Bolivian government denounced the occupation and ceased diplomatic and commercial relations with Chile. The war exploded. The difference between both contenders was abysmal; reason for which Bolivia requested the assistance of Peru in accordance with a defensive treaty that both powers had subscribed secretly in 1873.

It is difficult to evaluate if under the prevalent conditions at that time, Peru proceeded appropriately by involving itself in a foreign conflict to comply with an international commitment. Morally its performance was impeccable. But Peru was not prepared to face a conflict of those proportions; the ally was extremely weak and the enemy very strong, a fact that prevented to maintain a balance in the relationship of forces. Peru didn't declare war. Chile did it. But the ambiguity of Peru, who wanted to be a sincere mediator to the dispute but that on the other hand stayed stoically faithful to its military commitment with one of the involved parties, ended up generating resentments and hostilities and the collision became unavoidable (1).

It was obvious that at the beginning, the war was to develop at sea, because the maritime domain was fundamental to guarantee the success of the terrestrial operations of the contenders, including communications, displacement of troops, landings and provisioning along the extensive coasts of the South Pacific. It was not necessary to be a strategist to understand that the country that assured the domain of the sea would win the conflict. The first phase of what would be known as the War of the Pacific was going to be a maritime one.

If Chile was preparing itself for the war, may be debatable. There are indications in favor and some arguments against. In any event, that country had made an act of armed aggression supported by an organized and disciplined army based on the French military structure, and in a respectable naval force, still for European standards, organized under the parameters of the British Royal Navy.

The Chilean naval squadron -perhaps the best in Latin America after that of Brazil- was composed of two enormous twin battleships: The Admiral Cochrane and the Blanco Encalada, both designed by Sir Edward Reed and built in the navy Earle Ship Building Company of Yorkshire in 1876. These central battery ironclads had a displacement of 3,560 tons, a 4,300 horsepower engine, were twin screwed and had nine inch armor. They could reach 12.75 knots and possessed each one six 9-inch guns, four 4.7-inch guns, four 2.2-inch guns, one 20-pounder, one 7-pounder, four one-pounders, three 1-inch Nordenfeldt machine guns and four 14-inch torpedo launchers. Thanks to their design, they displaced less water, required fewer men and were less expensive than the older broadside style ironclads. A crew of 306 men handled each ship.

The Chilean fleet also had a new gunboat, the Magellan, built in the British navy Raenhill & Company and in service since 1874. She had a displacement of 950 tons, a 1,040-horse power engine and a speed of 11 knots. Her armament consisted of a 7-inch canyon, a 64-pound canyon and two 4-inch guns.

The Chilean armada equally had two wooden corvettes: the Esmeralda, built in Northfleet, Great Britain, in 1855, with a displacement of 854 tons, a 200 horse power engine and a speed of 8 knots. She was armed with twenty 32-pound guns and two 12-pounders; and the Abtao, built in 1864 for the North American Confederates during the Civil War, at the Scottish shipyard of Dennis Brothers. She displaced 1,600 tons, had steel reinforcement in the helmet and was armed with a 5.8 inch gun and four 4.7 inch guns. She had an 800 horsepower engine and could reach a maximum speed of 10 knots.

Chile’s Navy also had two "Alabama" type unarmored cruisers built in 1865 at the navy Ravenhill of London and commissioned as the Chacabuco and the O´Higgins. Each one displaced 1,101 tons and was armed with three 7-inch guns, two 70-pounders, four-40 pounders and four Hotchkiss machine guns. They had a 1,200 horsepower engine and could reach a maximum speed of 12.5 knots.

Additionally Chile had an old protected schooner, the Covadonga, former ship of the Spanish armada, built in El Ferrol in 1858. Protected with iron helmet, she displaced 412 tons, had a 140-horse power engine and a speed of 7 knots. She was provided with two 70 pounders, three 40 pounders and two nine-inch guns.

Chile also had two cutters: The Lautaro, built in 1870, with a weight of 120 tons and armed with one 40 pound gun and two 6-inch guns, and the Toro, built in 1874, with a weight of 150 tons, with similar weaponry as the Lautaro.

It possessed as well several brand new fast torpedo boats, which weight between 10 and 35 tons, and whose number were increased in purchases made between 1879 and 1881. Those ships were the Janaqueo, Colo Colo, Tucapel, Fresia, Tegualda, Recumilla, Glaura, Guale, Janaqueo 3, Vedette, Guacolda (former Peruvian Alay) and Quidoro. Most of those ships could reach a speed of 18 knots were armed with two torpedoes McEvoy and a Hotchkiss gun.

The Chilean fleet also had several transports, property of the Navy or lended from private companies. Among them, the Loa (1,675 tons); Lamar (967 tons); Copiapo (1,337 tons), Amazons (2,019 tons) Matias Cousiño (923 tons), Itata (2,232 tons), Tolten (317 tons), Valdivia (900 tons), Chile (1,672 tons), the Carlos Roberto 643 tons) and the Rimac (1,805 tons). The Loa, the Rimac, the Copiapo, the Amazonas, the Valdivia and the Carlos Roberto, were armed with guns and machine guns.

The fleet was commanded by Rear Admiral Juan Williams, who distinguished himself during the war against Spain of 1865-66. As him, the number of Chilean officers of British ancestors, such as Lieutenants Condell, Rogers, Simpson, Captain Thomson and Commander Patricio Lynch, was remarkable. This last one, son of a British citizen and a Peruvian lady, was attached as a young cadet to the Royal Navy and as such was a veteran of the second opium war between China and Great Britain.

Bolivia only had a nominal naval fleet, composed of three old small ships, among them the gunboat Sucre, all of which were seized by the Chileans at the beginning of the conflict.

Contrary to Chile, the Peruvian army was a small one because of the budgetary cuttings undertaken during the Administration of the Civilista Party. The difficult economic situation of the country hindered the necessary corrections, although the elected President of the Republic at the beginning of the war was a military officer: Mariano Ignacio Prado.

The Peruvian fleet in such a sense, except for an exception, had not been renewed in the last ten years. It was composed of two seagoing ironclads, two coastal iron monitors, two wooden corvettes, half a dozen small gunboats, some torpedo boats and six transports.

The armored central casemate frigate Independence was the biggest of the Peruvian ships. The J.A. Samuda House built her in England in 1865 at its river Tames Shipyards. She displaced 2004 tons, possessed a 4-inch amour, had 550-horse power and could reach a speed of 12,5 knots. She was armed with one 250-pounder muzzle-loader, two 150-pounder Parrots, twelve 70-pounders, four 32-pounders and four 9-pounders.

The old Canonicus class monitors, the Manco Capac and the Atahualpa, named after the first and the last kings of the Inca Empire, respectively, were acquired in 1868. Built for the United States Navy by Alex Swift and Company at the navy Rivers Works of Cincinnati, Ohio, and rushed in 1865, the first under the name of USS Oneota and the later as USS Catawaba, they were never commissioned. Both displaced 2,100 tons, had a 350-horse power engine and a theoretical speed of 8 knots. They were protected by a 3-inch armor which increased to 5 inches in the vital parts of the ships, and were armed each one with two XV-inch Dahlgren guns, mounted over a turret protected with a 10-inch armor. In reality however, because of their low speed and bad condition, they were floating batteries; the Atahualpa practically could not move and the Manco Capac could hardly reach 3.5 knots.

The two corvettes, which were very fast vessels, were the Union, originally built as a raider for the Confederate States of North America at the Vernes House in Nantes, France, in 1864. She displaced 1,600 tons, had a 500-horse power engine and a speed of 12.5 knots. She was armed with two 100-pounders, two 68-pounder Voruz and twelve 40-pounders; and the Pilcomayo ship of smaller might, but the newest of all, built in 1873 for the Peruvian government by Money Wigram & Sons in Blackwood, Great Britain, with machinery of J.Penn & Company of Greenwich. She displaced 800 tons, reached 11 knots of speed and was armed with two 70-pounders four 40-pounders and four 12-pounders.

The fleet was completed by the gunboats Arno, Urcos, Capitania, Resguardo and Tumbes, which were armed with one 40-pounder, one 32-pounder and machine-guns, as well as several Torpedo boats such as the Republica, Alianza and Independencia. The Republica and the Alianza were Herreshoff-class torpedo boats built in the United States, armed with Lay torpedoes. Those torpedoes could reach a speed of 12.5 knots and had a 36-kilos warhead of TNT. The squadron also had some transports like the Limeña (1860-1,162 tons), Chalaco (1863-999 tons), Talisman (1871-310 tons), Oroya (1873-1,050 tons), Mayro (1861-671 tons) and Marañón. Some of the transports were armed. The Limeña and the Chalaco had two muzzle-loader 40-pounders each while the Marañón was provided with two 70-pounders and four 40-pounders. Almost all of those ships were immobilized and in the middle of a repair process.

As it can be seen, the Chilean naval squadron, including the cutters, displaced a total of 13,408 tons, while the Peruvians had about 9,500 tons. The difference increased further, considering that the Chilean transports displaced almost 20,000 tons, against no more than 6,000 tons from their contenders. Chileans had a total of 114 guns and 10 Hotchkiss at sea, while the Peruvians had only 65 guns and a couple of Gatlings. So, in number, displacement, armor, artillery power, modernity and transports, the Chileans had absolute superiority. The Peruvians however replaced this disadvantage with very capable naval officers.

Without a doubt the main Peruvian warship was the old ironclad Huascar, whose characteristics have been explained in previous chapters of this book. Contrary to the rest of the fleet, the Huascar was the only one fairly operative, but on the contrary of her officers, the crew lacked the discipline and the experience in war. Without flatteries about the warlike capacity of the ironclad, her Commander formulated to President Prado’s cabinet the following warning:

“Gentlemen, we shall not make illusions; Huascar is without a doubt a very strong ship, but will never be able to counteract the power of the Chilean battleships, because those have an uniform armor of nine inches and six equal guns, to that which should be added that, at the moment, Huascar does not have the piercing shells to penetrate their armor, neither fairly expedite seamanship, not being of little importance their advantage of having a double helix that allows them to execute their movements without losing position and with supreme speed; in spite of everything Huascar will fulfill her duty, still when she has the security of her sacrifice”

Huascar sailed with a crew of 200 men. The naval officialdom, headed by Grau, was composed of one Frigate Captain, one Corvette Captain, three First Lieutenants and four Second Lieutenants. She had four surgeons and eight interns. Huascar had eight engineers, some of them British nationals, and twenty-five Non Commissioned Officers. She also had 42 gunners and two army battalions with 45 soldiers and two captains. She had as well an endowment of several sailors and cabin boys.

After the Battle of Iquique, (see next chapter) Grau and the Huascar remained practically alone to face the powerful Chilean fleet. On May 24, 1879, Huascar returned to Iquique. Soon she began her loner forays and intruded into the busy Bolivian ports of Cobija, Tocopillo and Mejillones. There she destroyed seven boats and recovered the Peruvian schooner Clorinda previously captured by the Chileans. Two days later she engaged in a two hour combat against the port batteries of Antofagasta, destroying all of them. On May 27, she destroyed the marine cable that connected Antofagasta and Valparaiso. Later, Huascar sunk six other boats. On the 28th, Huascar recovered another captured Peruvian schooner, the Caqueta, and at the same time captured the Chilean transport Emilia, which was navigating with an important copper load. During her return to Peruvian waters, on August 29, she was pursued unfruitful by the battleship Blanco Encalada, then the flagship of Rear Admiral Williams. The Huascar had become a nightmare for the Chileans.

On the second of June, Huascar sailed from Arica to the port of Pisagua, she continued for Iquique and went into a recognition mission toward the Southern coasts. The following day, between Huanillos and Punta de Lobos, she met again with the battleship Blanco Encalada and the corvette Magellan. At 13:10 hours, Huascar open fire and following orders of the Naval Command started to retreat. After a brief exchange of shots, the fold continued and after 18 hours of persecution she managed to avoided her big pursuer. Later, she returned to Callao so the damages suffered during those actions could be repaired.

On July 6th, under strict orders to avoid any risks with the battleships, Huascar left again Callao towards the South and at day nine, at the coasts of Antofagasta, she fought simultaneously against the corvettes Abtao and Magellan, to which she caused diverse mishaps. She was about to sunk the armed transport Matias Cousiño, but before the appearance of the battleship Cochrane, she suspended the actions and returned to Arica. During this encounter Huascar suffered some light damages in her armor.

July 17th marked the beginning of the fourth campaign, whose objective was to harass the enemy coasts in reprisal for the gunfire that the day before Chilean warships made against Iquique, a defenseless Peruvian port. Between the 19th and the 20th, Huascar captured the Chilean ships Adelaida Rojas and E. Saucy Jack, dispatching them to Callao. She also destroyed all the boats anchored at the Bay of Chanaral. The 21st Huascar sunk the boats anchored in Huasco. Then, on the 22nd, she captured the cargo ship Adriana Lucia. The following day, in a combined operation with the corvette Union, Huascar sized a valuable prey: The 1,870-ton Rimac, armed with four 32-pounders, one of the best Chilean transports which was carrying a complete cavalry squadron belonging to the regiment Carabineros de Yungay. The capture of that ship and the loss of the squadron under command of Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Bulnes -260 men with rifles, ammunition, sables and 215 horses -, was a hard blow for the Chileans. This produced a great revolt in Chile and angry manifestations against the government caused several deads and wounded.

On the first of August Grau undertook a new campaign in which she intruded in the ports of Coquimbo, Taltal and Tocopilla. Later on, on the 24th of that month, after finding out that the corvettes Magellan and Abtao, the transport Limari and a small steamer, were anchored in Antofagasta, Grau decided to attack them. At dawn of the following day, by means of a skilled maneuver, Huascar was able to get between the Chilean warships and fourteen merchant vessels anchored in the port. Next she placed herself into attack position and fired a torpedo against the Magellan. However the torpedo failed. One day later, in Taltal, Huascar destroyed three more enemy boats and captured other six. By then Grau had become already a national hero and Peruvians saw in him the figure of an invincible warrior whose abilities were demonstrated by facing alone the whole enemy fleet. On August 26th, Congress, in unanimous decision, promoted him to Rear Admiral, the highest rank for a Peruvian naval officer of those days.

On August 28th Huascar returned to Antofagasta and fought simultaneously in combat, once again, against the corvettes Abtao and Magellan and several land batteries, one of which was provided with five 300 and 150-pounder guns. The encounter lasted four hours. Chilean batteries and ships fired a total of 110 projectiles against 28 of Huascar. The Peruvian ironclad was hit by only one grenade, lost one officer and had one sailor wounded, but in turn she caused severe mishaps and numerous dead and wounded in both corvettes, -26 of them in the Abtao-, and destroyed fifteen of the terrestrial batteries. The correspondent of the newspaper “El Mercurio” in Antofagasta wrote in this respect:

“The havocs produced in the Abtao by the shots of the Huascar were terrible”

After being promoted, Grau gave up his Admiral's badge to keep command of the Huascar and requested the promotion of all his officers to the immediate superior rank. He continued his extraordinary work, bombarding only fortified ports, capturing transports without harming their crews, destroying enemy boats and keeping open the communications between Callao and the other ports of the Peruvian coast and consequently paralyzing the enemy navy and army.

. . . .

(1) When news about the Chilean occupation of Antofagasta reached Lima there was general indignation and most of the population, aroused by the press, claimed the intervention of Peru. President Prado, aware of the military weakness of the country, decided to avoid conflict by sending an emissary to mediate between Chile and Bolivia. His name was Jose Antonio de Lavalle, a very talented diplomat. The Peruvian envoy arrived in Valparaiso on March 4, 1879 and was received within a hostile environment. He presented the Chilean Government with a peace plan, which included the following provisions: a. Chile and Bolivia would submit their territorial differences to an arbiter. 2. Bolivia would cancel the 10-cent tax over the Chilean nitrate exports. The Chilean public opinion rejected the proposal. Mobs attacked the Peruvian Consulate and Mr. Lavalle had to be escorted to a hotel for his safety. In his next meeting with the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs he was asked about the nature of the “secret” defense treaty between Peru and Bolivia. Things complicated after Bolivia declared war on Chile and requested Peru to fulfill its commitments according to the treaty. Through its Minister in Lima, Mr. Joaquin Godoy, Chile asked Peru to declare its neutrality in the war with Bolivia. President Prado, a man of honor –and a politician after all- concluded that it was impossible. On April 3, 1879, Chile broke diplomatic relations with Peru and two days later declared war.