The intelligent strategy of Baquedano consisted in moving his troops around the mountain range, in such a way that his forces will appear over the valley of Chacalluta and not on the North, as the Peruvian officers expected. Gradually, these forces began the advance of 65 kilometers from their positions in Tacna until the North of the river Lluta, where they sieged the objective. That same day the Chilean Chief of Staff, Velázquez, sent the following telegram to Santiago:

"The Peruvian remanents of the battle of Tacna took different directions, but none went to Arica. The regiments Buin, 3rd and 4th, the Bulnes, 22 guns and 400 cavalry are now two leagues from Arica. Tomorrow we will attack from the rearguard together with the squadron."

On the second of June, a detachment of Chilean cavalry under Mayor Vargas Pinochet captured engineer Elmore and his assistant, lieutenant Pedro Ureta, while they undertook a chancy sabotage action with electric mines. Ureta, victim of his wounds, died later on, and Elmore, who was about to be shot because of his civilian condition, was spared and taken into interrogation.

From their positions the Peruvians observed the enemy's arrival, still awaiting for the reinforcements. However neither the forces of Montero neither those of the II Army of the South would arrive. As it has been pointed out, Montero left with the dispersed ones toward Arequipa and Leiva moved away from Sama and went toward the mountains to contact part of the dispersed batallions of Tacna and to pick up weapons and ammunition. Corollary of the tragedy, these two movements constituted the sentence of death over Arica. Bolognesi ignored what happened and insisted on requesting orders and information, which were fundamental elements for the faith of his position. Under such conditions he sent to Rear Admiral Montero a communication which reflected the total isolation of the garrisson.

"I have sent to Your Excellency, four telegrams, none of whom has been answered. I have not received neither any official order from you, so I am in total darkness. I need that you inform me about the condition of the army, its position, the determinations and plans, and mainly, the orders. Arica will resist until the last man and I believe it may be rescued if you, with the rest of the army or together with the forces of Leiva, advance towards us from Sama or Pachía or make an effort to unite with us. We have provisions. I need the telegraphic codes urgently. Only five dispersed had arrived. We are ready to combat".

Rear Admiral Montero on the other hand, with the remains of the I Army of the South, had organized in Tarata a war council to decide the actions to adopt. The council decided unanimously to continue the march toward Arequipa. The only exception was that of the colonel Andrés Avelino Cáceres who insisted before Montero to advance toward Arica to help Bolognesi. In clear minority, the intents of the future "Brujo de los Andes" were vain (8).

On the other hand, the II Army of the South, undertook a series of pathetic marches and counter-marches that culminated with the return of colonel Leiva's troops to Arequipa. On June two Leiva camped in Mirave, farther still from the theater of operations. From there he sent a telegram to Montero requesting orders. When not receiving them, he returned to Tarata.

Apparently colonel Segundo Leiva didn't decide to march to Arica because of a primordial reason: Fear. Fear that his inexperienced troops collided against the enemy and were virtually destroyed, given the scarce preparation of the soldiers. The II Army of the South, created by the Supreme Director Piérola for political reasons more than strategic ones, theorically had about 5,000 soldiers, but in reality it only possessed 2,300 men. Those belonging to the battalions "Dos de Mayo" and "Huancané" only spoke Quechua and aymara, lacked the most elementary military preparation and had never entered into combat.

In a fragile discharge, the controversial colonel Leiva manifested:

"The State of those masses that took the name of II Army of the South, has not been able to be corrected completely until that date. Those forces would have been sacrificed sterilely, because like it has been seen, the defeat of Tacna didn't leave on our behalf organized or useful people able to increase or improve the conditions from the army under my control, and the long itinerary that had to be travel from Locumba to Arica was intercepted by the enemy." After the scouts from Arica communicated the displacements of the Chilean forces in Chacalluta, Colonel Bolognesi sent a new message to the prefect of Arequipa:

"All enemy cavalry at Chacalluta. They have repaired railroad. Not possible to communicate Campero. Siege or attack, we will resist."

To be continued ...